Central to this article is the use of sports mega-events as part of a state's 'soft power' strategy.
Introduction
'Soft power' is in vogue. Not since the early 2000s has an academic concept been adopted so readily by politicians, policy-makers, media commentators and scholars alike. At that time, Robert Putnam's book 1 
The State of the Debate
The concept of 'soft power' was coined in 1990 by the American political scientist, Joseph Nye.
For Nye, the 'power' aspect of the concept refers to one's ability to 'effect the outcomes you want, and, if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this happen' 8 . For national leaders, Nye suggests political outcomes can be attained through a combination of both 'hard' and 'soft' strategies. 9 10 On the one hand, leaders may utilize forms of 'hard power', through, for example, offering economic rewards or drawing on military force; on the other, leaders may indirectly adapt the political agenda in such a way which shapes the preferences of others through, for instance, emulating one's 'intangible assets': attractive culture, pioneering ideologies, and/or credible, legitimate and commendable institutions, values and policies. 11 12 13 It is this latter approach which Nye calls 'soft power': 'the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion'. 14 Such attraction converts into power outcomes when those on the receiving end of the soft power strategy look to the state producing it for affirmation, guidance and leadership, or seek to imitate their domestic and/or international achievements. 15 16 This is not to suggest, however, that soft power should necessarily replace the utilization of hard power -in-fact national leaders should, whenever possible, endeavor to combine the soft dimension of attraction with the hard dimensions of coercion and inducement (what Nye terms 'smart power'). 17 18 Rather, Nye advocates that nation-states should take greater advantage of the former. 19 20 Nye's rationale for this is three fold. First, since the end of the Cold War, nationstates have become far more concerned with forms of welfare over military glory, whereby, in the modern era, national leaders need greater public support before engaging in forceful pursuits. 21 Second, for the majority of powers, the use of force severely jeopardizes their economic objectives and ability to maintain international competitiveness. 22 23 Finally, the increasing influence of the information revolution and globalization has led to states' behavior coming under closer scrutiny than ever before. 24 25 The result is that the use of force has become less tolerated in post-industrial (and, in particular, advanced capitalist) societies, leading to the increasing significance of soft forms of power.
26
The consequence of this heightened significance has resulted in soft power becoming well and truly bound up within a multiplicity of contemporary discourses. First off is the academic:
commentators' endeavors to unpick, understand and extend soft power conceptually, but in line articles that, at least more frequently, do attempt to provide a partial conceptual explanation. Perhaps most significantly here, however, is the increasing discussion of soft power in the context of the so-called emerging nation-states. Nye 37 38 39 himself has drawn heavily on the soft power of the U.S., detailing the overarching reach of it cultural products, educational and technological excellence, tolerant immigration policies, and political stability. However, due to the inability to fight global poverty, protect the environment, the use of force outside its borders, and the failure of the so-called 'Wall Street model', Nye 40 41 suggests the general perception is that America's soft power is in decline. 42 This is complemented, of course, with the rising economic and technological might of countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China, which, as academic discourse suggests, all have soft power ambitions of their own.
Chinese authorities, for example, are currently engaged in a soft power offensive in order to project a more benevolent and less threatening image of the country. 43 budget. 57 Nevertheless, in general, an SME of the first order pertains to the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics; smaller events -often with a major regional impact -are the so-called second order SMEs (for example, the Commonwealth or Pan American Games). Whichever definition is used, sports megas are increasingly being used by states of all political hues to project an image to the outside world, and acquiring and hosting have become key factors in local and national development strategies. 58 Most specifically in this context are the potential 'legacies' that are said to come with both applying for and hosting SMEs. 59 A cursory glance at the sport studies literature on SMEs suggests that such legacies range from an increase in the number of a state's citizens participating in sport, 60 city regeneration, 61 employment, 62 tourism gains, 63 64 and a 'feel-good' factor among the hosts' population. 65 66 In the much-cited case of Los Angeles, for example, the staging of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games brought the city a surplus of approximately £215 million; 67 in the case of the 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympic Games, the rate of unemployment around the city fell from 18.4% to 9.6%; 68 and one of the central objectives behind the hosting of the London 2012 Summer Olympic Games was to increase the rate of sports participation, leading to a fitter and healthier society. 69 However, it should be made explicit here that, in the majority of cases, SMEs fail to produce the legacies trumpeted in the pre-event rhetoric and that any positive impacts are often difficult to attribute, with confidence, to the event. Moreover, SMEs can actually leave behind a number of negative economic and social consequences for their hosts. 70 
Methods
Our data collection strategy involved a series of three stages with which to unpack the role of SMEs in the Brazilian and UK soft power strategies. In recent years these ambassadors have to visit selected countries including Israel, Jordan and Palestine.
While the domestic and international perception of the London 2012 Games was generally very positive it is difficult to assess the utility of diplomatic value of sport as a soft power resource.
While it is doubtful that UK sport diplomacy had a negative impact on the pursuit of the UK government's foreign policy objectives it is difficult to determine the extent to which a positive impact was generated. Where countries have either eschewed the use of hard power, as is the case with Germany and Japan, or simply do not possess a significant hard power capability sport soft power is, by default, a relatively significant resource and potentially effective resource.
However, where a country is still giving prominence to the hard power resources in its diplomatic portfolio, as is the case with the UK, it is doubtful whether the deployment of sport soft power resources is capable of doing more than reinforcing hard power objectives.
Brazil's 'Double Host' Status
On the surface Brazil would appear to fit the classic typology of an 'emerging state' or 'rising power', one which attempts to use a variety of strategies to announce its arrival on the world stage, often burnishing its image and attracting tourists to its shores. As discussed, hosting
SMEs are certainly part of a broader concerted 'soft power' strategy; 111 however, there are a number of issues that set Brazil apart from other so-called 'BRICS' countries (Russia, India, China and South Africa). Generic themes of 'image leveraging' bind hosting states across the political spectrum from the UK to Qatar -especially after Germany's successful image overhaul, in part through staging the FIFA World Cup in 2006 -but Brazil is unique in a number of ways.
In Brazil's case, for instance, it is not simply to announce that it is ready 'to signal [its] "graduation" to the status....of advanced state' 112 -that is, move from the periphery to the core - During his two terms in office (2003-2006 and 2007-2010) , the former president, Lula, used to refer to himself as this messiah, arguing that his government would do for the country much more than the previous governments in Brazil's history put together. It was (and has been) a very effective rhetorical tool, which contributed to his charismatic legitimacy. Lula adopted a political strategy based on a discourse made up of this imagery of Brazil as the 'land of the future' and enacted measures which underpinned this imagery in practice.
It is worth noting that Lula's rhetoric, drawing on the 'land of the future' notion discussed In 2007 President Lula had suggested that no public money would be spent on the World Cup.
At this time there was considerable debate about budget overspend and corruption with monies belonging to the people being siphoned off. Subsequent events made hollow Lula's promise: the Federal Government not only had to pump resources into the construction of stadia, but had to make up the short-fall of ever increasing regional budgets. Officially, the exponential rise in costs for the World Cup has been attributed to FIFA's demands; the late delivery of the World Cup infrastructure, unfinished at the time of writing, reveals the gap between Government rhetoric and the reality on-the-ground.
The building of transport infrastructure, designed to provide better mobility to and within host cities, is also presenting many problems. One of the primary legacies promised was the construction or reform of airports, underground trains, high-speed train systems and so on. 
Conclusion
This article has set out to interrogate the use of sports mega-events as part of state's soft power strategies by focusing on both an advanced capitalist state (the UK) and an 'emerging' state (Brazil). The rationale behind this endeavor was to shed light on, and clarify, the concept of 'soft power', which has, up until now, not been used widely in relation to sport.
The acquisition and successful hosting of such SMEs is now looked upon as a significant 'litmus test' for would-be leading states globally. Although the precise mechanisms through which a state is said to gain in soft power due to hosting a successful SME are not clear, showcasing the ability to deal with the logistics of such an event appears to be crucial to how hosts are viewed by others.
While the concept of soft power, as suggested in this article, is of use as a lens through which to understand why states wish to host sports mega-events, it is a broad-brush concept that does not allow for the nuances between states: whereas the UK's image abroad was very positive before 122 the event and to better this was not the key aim, Germany used the 2006 World Cup to alter a tarnished image; Brazil, on the other hand, does not suffer from a negative image abroad, but wishes to consolidate its regional power position on the global stage. Thus, the use of similar SMEs are not always for parallel reasons, despite being part of states' much wider soft power strategies. There are a number of ways in which a state's use of SMEs could be compared across cases; however, a direct, comparative method of analysis misses a number of key points. First, as we have sought to make clear, successful and wealthy advanced capitalist states, such as Germany, have a very different resource base, including infrastructure, from which to launch a sports-related soft power strategy than a so-called 'emerging state'. Germany did not need to convince a doubtful electorate of the need to invest in roads, transport links and other logistics, as all these existed before the event took place. 125 Equally, given that Germany has little 'hard power' to speak of, it was able to focus almost exclusively on leveraging a positive image globally. Brazil, on the other hand, is not in the same position financially and does not have over fifty years of democratic rule under its belt. Equally, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil is simply using its double host status as a Trojan Horse for neo-liberal reforms that will push the country towards as more 'developed' status. Such a reading is a narrow and linear understanding of development in terms of a growing global power. What is clear, however, is that while the use of sports mega-events appears to have become part and parcel of most states' soft power packages, the benefits that are said to derive from hosting them remain over-stated, over-inflated and under researched. It is hoped that the ideas put forward in this paper can form the basis of future work on the role of sports mega-events in states' soft power strategies. It is clear, however, that there is a need to understand the mechanisms by which soft power actually assists states in gaining international prestige how they can prevent such strategies backfiring and leading to 'soft disempowerment'.
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Past research indicates that societies with deep structural divides and fault lines -inequality in society, poverty, high-crime, corruption etc. -are very unlikely to change as a result of an SME or any hoped-for legacy. Shortly before, during and after, sport certainly papers over such cracks, but without fundamental reform and the will to change, cracks soon reappear once the perennial sport circus rolls out of town and on to the next.
